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Abstract. In this paper we use the unit root test at both individual company (Dickey-Fuller) and
panel (Im-Pesaran-Shin) level, in order to provide some quantitative evidence of the univariate
behaviour of Italian companies’ debt-ratio. If it is mean-reverting, then at least a share of
companies are going to behave according to the trade-off model, whereas if it is non-stationary,
then companies may behave according to pecking order theory. Individual company test results
support the pecking order theory in the case of more than 80% of firms, while the panel test
rejects the unit root null. These contradictory results can be explained by the heterogeneity of
the firms which tends to characterise the entire panel. For this reason, we selected a number of
sub-samples in which companies are supposed to follow either the pure trade-off or the pure
pecking order model of behaviour. Results confirm that: a) heterogeneity may lead to a false
rejection of the pecking order theory in panel unit root tests; b) both trade-off and pecking order
theories contribute towards explaining the financial behaviour of Italian companies; c) the
testing procedure we propose has the power to reject the pure pecking order model under the
null hypothesis, but not the pure trade-off model.
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21. Introduction
Since the appearance of Nelson and Plosser’s findings (1982) regarding a number of
macroeconomic time series for the US, a significant percentage of recent empirical literature has
been devoted to exploring the univariate properties of economic variables. Univariate outcomes are
useful ways of characterising available data and preventing the researcher from producing spurious
regressions (Granger and Newbold, 1974). Moreover, unit root outcomes may shed light on specific
theories (see, for example, King, Plosser, Stock and Watson, 1991). In this paper, we propose to use
unit root tests to obtain empirical evidence of the financial behaviour of Italian companies.
Theoretical literature on corporate finance presents two models. The trade-off theory (TO)
(Bradley, Jarrell and Kim, 1984; Harris and Raviv, 1991) suggests that each firm has, or rather,
particular classes of companies have, specific optimal debt-to-equity ratios, determined by
balancing the present value of expected marginal benefits of leverage (for example, tax savings due
to the deductibility of interest paid) against the present value of expected marginal costs of leverage
(for example, default costs). According to TO theory, each company borrows in order to gradually
move towards its optimal debt-equity ratio, which in turn maximises its market value (given by the
present value of the sum of the expected costs and benefits of debt). Under plausible conditions,
such as increasing marginal failure costs, the TO model presents a unique interior optimum capital
structure for each type of company. If the current capital structure is perceived as optimal, then,
unless perceptions change, the same capital structure will be viewed as optimal in future periods as
well. Moreover, the cost of adjustment towards the target is not of primary concern in the TO
model, and as such is rarely mentioned. This is why TO theory is also defined as “static TO theory”.
The pecking order theory (PO) (Myers and Majluf, 1984) shows that, since investors are less
informed about a firm’s value than existing shareholders are, external financing may be mis-priced
by the market: this under-pricing generates under-investment, i.e. the rejection of investment
projects even if their net present values are positive. Thus the PO model suggests that firms adhere
to a financial hierarchy in order to maximise their values: internal funds are given preference over
external ones in financing investments; if external financing is needed, firms first seek debt funding,
which is less subject to asymmetric information and lemon problems than new shares are; equity is
only issued as a last resort, subsequent to stock price increases and/or when additional debt
financing would be extremely costly because its value is affected by the revealing of managers’
inside information. Unlike the TO model, therefore, the PO model does not envisage the existence
of a target leverage: the debt-ratio is simply the sum of previous periodical hierarchical choices;
retained earnings (internal equity) stand at the top of the hierarchy of preferences, while stock issues
(external equity) lie at the bottom. Moreover, if riskless debt (the value of which is not affected by
3inside information, and which has no stock price effects) is available, firms never issue equity in a
situation of extreme asymmetry of information; in this case, the PO theory requires an exogenous
debt constraint.
From the empirical point of view, the TO hypothesis implies the assumption that the optimal
debt-ratio is stable over time, and that the actual ratio fluctuates around it. On the basis of this
mean-reverting property, the target is not estimated as a function of its determinants, but is
measured using the historical mean of the actual debt-equity ratios (Taggart, 1977, Marsh, 1982,
Jalilvand and Harris, 1984, Bradley, Jarrell and Kim, 1984, Opler and Titman, 1997, Shyam-Sunder
and Myers, 1999). In the TO empirical model, the use of the historical mean of leverage minimises
the effects of transient variations in time due to business cycles, flotation costs and companies’
lagged adjustments towards their target debt-ratios. What is important is the long–term, average
firm leverage (and not the determinants of periodical adjustment to the target debt-ratio), in order to
decide whether the deviation from target of current debt-ratios, and the various leverage-related
costs and benefits, are economically significant enough to influence the borrowing decisions of
companies. The PO hypothesis empirically manifests itself in the form of a relationship between
debt issues (or debt variations) and the availability of retained earnings.
Hence, unit root tests may provide empirical support for the predictions of TO and PO
theories. In statistical terms, this issue can be tackled by answering the question of whether
corporate debt-ratio time series are stationary or whether they exhibit a unit root. In the case of
stationarity, the implicit mean-reverting behaviour suggests that companies gradually adjust
towards an optimal and constant debt-ratio; in other terms, random shocks only have transitory
effects on leverage. Thus the TO prediction works, and the use of the historical mean of leverage as
a proxy for the target does not bias empirical results. Instead, the presence of unit roots is consistent
with PO behaviour, where a well-defined optimal debt-ratio is lacking: debt changes are not driven
by any attempt to attain an optimal capital structure, but simply reflect the need for external funds to
finance investment projects. In other terms, random shocks, especially those pertaining to liquidity
constraints, have a permanent effect on the financial structure of firms.
However, the presence of unit roots does not necessarily invalidate the TO model. In fact,
the target debt-ratio itself may be unstable over time, as it may change according to changes in its
non-stationary determinants, or to structural breaks. If some of the costs or benefits of borrowing
vary, this may lead firms to structurally increase or decrease their reliance on corporate debt. If this
is the case, we cannot use the sample period average to measure the target debt-ratio; instead, we
have to estimate it as a function of its determinants (Bontempi, 2001). For this reason, unit root tests
against a constant mean reversion have the power to reject the PO under the null, but the non-
4rejection of the null does not entail the rejection of the TO. Our result is consistent with that of
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) who, by assuming the behaviour of TO to be mean-reverting, and
by using a different methodology, also show that “the target-adjustment models are not rejected
even when false. The pecking order, when false, can be easily rejected. Thus our tests have the
power with respect to the pecking order” (p. 242).
In this paper, we make time-series and panel unit root tests of company debt-ratios,
measured as long and short-term debt to intermediaries (banks and other financial institutions such
as factoring and leasing) on assets. Figures have been taken from a balanced panel of 5,079 Italian
manufacturing companies over the 1982-1995 period, drawn from the Company Accounts Data
Service data-set. Further information about data sources are available in Bontempi (2001).
The paper is arranged as follows. In section 2 we carry out the Dickey and Fuller (1979) unit
root tests (DF and augmented DF, ADF) based on individual company debt-ratio time series. We
use DF and ADF tests because they are comparable with the panel unit root test suggested by Im,
Pesaran and Shin (1997) (IPS), that we performed in section 3. Given the discrepancy between the
time series and panel unit root test results, we avoid extending the homogeneity of stationarity or
non-stationarity proprieties to the whole panel.1 Instead, in section 4, we carry out sub-panel unit
root analyses, and compare results obtained in sub-samples selected on the basis of theoretical
considerations such as homogeneous financial behaviour, with results obtained in randomly drawn
sub-samples of companies. In section 5 we summarise the main results.
2. The single-company unit root test
Static TO behaviour may be formulated as the following target adjustment mechanism:
[1] Ddit = ai (dit-1 – d*it) + eit
where d indicates the actual debt-ratio, d* is the target debt-ratio, and e is the stochastic error term.
When parameter ai<0, firms adjust towards the long-term target, although they may deviate from it
in the short run. The target debt-ratio may be defined as follows:
[2] d*it= d*i + uit
where d*i is the specific firm’s optimal debt-ratio, constant over time and determined by the trade-
off between the costs and benefits of borrowing; uit is the zero mean stochastic component of the
optimal leverage, which is stationary if the target is stable over time.
By substituting [2] in [1], we obtain:
                                                                
1 Karlsson and Lothgren (2000) analyse panel unit root test power using a number of Monte Carlo simulations, and
advice caution when assessing the stationarity properties of data on the basis of panel unit root results only.
5[3] Ddit = ci + ai dit-1 + v it
where ci is the constant term whereby d*i = - ci/ai; vit = eit – aiuit depends on both the error of
equation [1] and the stochastic component of equation [2]. The general formulation of equation [3]
is as follows:
[4] Ddit = ci + pi dit-1 + å
=
p
j
ijã
1
Ddit-j + uit
If we suppose that both e and u are white noise processes, then p=0 and equation [4] reduces
to the DF unit root test model for the ith firm as in equation [3]. In the case of more complex
dynamics of e and/or u, we have to set p>0 until u is a white noise process (ADF test equation).
For each of the 5,079 companies in our balanced 1984 - 1995 panel we performed both DF
and ADF(1)2 tests: the null is pi = 0, i.e. the debt-ratio stochastic process for the ith firm has a unit
root; under the alternative, pi < 0, i.e. the ith company leverage is mean-reverting. The estimated
probability density function of the DF statistics is presented in figure 1; in order to improve
readability, we trimmed the distribution at 2%.3
Fig. 1 – Distribution of 5,079 individual DF statistics
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The vertical line represents the 10% critical value of the test (equal to –2.718 from
MacKinnon, 1991): for about 82% of the cases the null is not 10% rejected, leading to a strong
                                                                
2 Given the limited time span, we prefer to avoid longer lags; moreover, dealing with annual data, a second order
autoregressive dynamic should be enough to avoid residual serial correlation. The first two years (1982-1983) are used
for the initialisation of the dynamic process.
3 The density of ADF statistics is not plotted, as it is almost identical to the DF one.
6presumption in favour of unit roots.4 On the basis of individual company test results, we could
conclude that in a large number of cases, Italian manufacturing firms do not seem to be driven by a
constant debt-ratio target, but behave in line with PO theory.
Previous results may depend either on low speeds of adjustment (pi) of actual to target debt-
ratios, or on high standard errors in their estimation. On the basis of pi estimates corresponding to
DF statistics in Figure 1, we calculated that about one year is necessary for the median company to
close half of the deviation between actual and target debt-ratios.5 This adjustment period seems
quite short compared with our time span of 12 years. Since one relevant factor in unit root testing is
the length of the time span compared to the length of the period for which data is available (Hakkio
and Rush, 1991), a 1984-1995 sample period might be sufficient enough for our purposes.
Thus, the precision of pi estimates might be the main problem we have with our DF test
results. In order to tackle this issue, in the next section we perform panel unit root tests: the
advantage in doing so is that, since the power of the tests depends on the total variation in the data
used (both in the number of observation and their variability), the cross-section variation adds
information to time series variability, and leads to potentially more precise parameter estimates
(Taylor and Sarno, 1998, p. 283). A formal demonstration of the fact that exploiting cross-sectional
as well as time-series variability may increase the power of unit root tests, can be found in Levin
and Lin (1992).
3. The panel unit root test
Since the seminal work of Hakkio (1984), a significant number of papers have been devoted
to the test of the purchasing power parity hypothesis within the panel framework.6 However,
research has not been addressed to the exchange rate issue alone, and the time series properties of
many macroeconomic variables have also been extensively investigated at panel level. 7 Banerjee,
Marcellino and Osbat (2001) warn of the validity of test results regarding macroeconomic variables
                                                                
4 Detailed results are available upon request.
5 The first quartile is slightly less than 8 months; the third quartile is about 2 years.
6These include: Frankel and Rose (1996), Higgins and Zakrajsek (1999), MacDonald (1996), O’Connell (1998), Oh
(1996), Papell (1997), and Wu (1996).
7 For example, the properties of the real GDP of 48 US states were analysed by Strauss (2000), the inflation rate for 13
OECD countries by Culver and Papell (1997), the price indices for 19 US cities by Cecchetti, Mark and Sonora (2000),
the current account per output for 10 OECD countries by Wu (2000), the unemployment rate for 48 US states by Song
and Wu (1997) and for US states and EU countries by León-Ledesma (2000), the interest rate for 12 OECD countries
by Wu and Zhang (1996).
7for several countries if potential cross-unit cointegration does in fact exist.8 We think this criticism
is less stringent in our case, since we use more than 5,000 microeconomic 12 -year time series for
companies, and cross-company debt-ratio co-movements are not so obvious as in the case of
countries.
A number of unit root/stationarity panel tests can be found in the literature: the LL test
(Levin and Lin 1992, 1993), the Zm test (Hadri, 2000), and the IPS t-bar test (Im, Pesaran and Shin,
1997). A limit of the unit root LL test, as noted by Maddala and Wu (1999, p. 635), is the restriction
pi = p, " i: all the individual autoregressive parameters are supposed to be the same under both the
null hypothesis and its alternative. In our case, it is quite unrealistic to suppose that under the
alternative hypothesis each company’s debt-ratios revert to their respective unconditional means at
the same rate. The stationarity Zm test is applicable to panel data with large T and moderate N. In
fact, in order to derive the asymptotic distribution of the test statistic, Hadri (2000, p. 152) follows a
sequential limit approach (T ® ¥ followed by N ® ¥) that is justified in a situation where the panel
data set has many more time series components than cross-section components. Since we have
T=12 and N=5079, it is clear that the Zm test is inappropriate for our panel data set.
Therefore, the most suitable test in our case is the IPS one. In fact, it relaxes the assumption
that all autoregressive parameters are the same for all individuals; moreover, the IPS statistic is
valid as T and N ® ¥. IPS perform N-independent DF tests on the significance of the parameter p
in equation [4]. By using Monte Carlo methods in the case of balanced panels, IPS tabulate the first,
E(ti,T), and the second, V(ti,T), moments of the DF (and ADF) statistics (ti,T), and show that:
[5] Þ
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Under the null hypothesis of the IPS test, all the N individual time series have a unit root:
[6] pi = 0 "i
while under the alternative hypothesis they are grouped into two complementary sets: NS of non-
stationary processes, and N1-S of stationary processes:
pi = 0 "i Î NS
[7]
pi < 0 "i Î N1-S
The results of IPS tests for Italian firms are given in Table 1; trimmed means are also given in order
to check the sensitiveness of the results to the presence of outliers.
                                                                
8 By using a set of Monte Carlo experiments, they show that “The empirical size of the tests is substantially higher than
the nominal level, so that the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected very often, even if correct.” (p. 1).
8The results always reject the unit root under the null hypothesis: the full sample t-bar
statistic and the trimmed averages are lower than both the exact 1% sample critical values (more
reliable), and those critical values obtained using simulated moments and asymptotic standard
normal percentiles. Outcomes are also robust to the specification of error dynamics (DF and ADF
tests). The slight increase in ADF test statistics results from partial inefficiency due to the
introduction of sometimes-unnecessary dynamics. In fact, following Campbell and Perron (1991)
suggestion of leaving lags whose corresponding estimates are 10% significant, the augmentation is
only significant in 16.8% of cases.
Finally, in order to take account of the potential dependence among individuals, together
with the influence of macroeconomic shocks, we subtract the cross-sectional mean of the debt-ratio
of each period, and then we apply the IPS test to the transformed data. The outcome remains much
the same: the unit root null is rejected.
Tab. 1 – t-bar tests over different trimming options and time effects
Average Number of firms DF ADF(1)
Levels:
Full sample mean 5079 -1.950 -1.708
2% trim 4978 -1.894 -1.764
10% trim 4573 -1.871 -1.745
20% trim 4066 -1.856 -1.735
Deviations from cross-sectional averages (demeaned):
Full sample mean 5079 -1.922 -1.800
2% trim 4978 -1.899 -1.780
10% trim 4573 -1.870 -1.755
20% trim 4066 -1.853 -1.743
1% (5%) critical values
exact sample (*) - -1.740 (-1.670) -
asymptotic (**) - -1.545 (-1.536) -1.536 (-1.526)
(*) Im, Pesaran and Shin (1997), Table 4; T=15, N=100
(**) Authors calculations from Im, Pesaran and Shin (1997), Table 2; T=15
It is often claimed that the panel framework of the unit root test provides greater power than
the individual time series unit root test (Oh, 1996, p. 413). Thus, if conflicting results are obtained
from individual and panel unit root tests, we should have more faith in the panel results because of
their greater power. Previous results could lead us to conclude that a sizeable subgroup of Italian
companies has a long-term target debt-ratio that can be proxied by the sample mean, as predicted by
TO.
94. Unit roots and heterogeneity
The main failing of panel unit root tests is that the null hypothesis (usually that all the series
in the panel are realisations of unit root processes) will be violated even if a very small number of
series in the panel are stationary, and rejection cannot help us calculate the entity of that number
(Taylor and Sarno, 1998, p. 283). In empirical studies of panel unit root tests, really extreme cases
are reported. In Wu (2000) the unit root null is 5% rejected even though the only case (at the
individual level) of a stationary process is excluded from the panel. These results confirm Culver
and Papell (1997) findings concerning the fragility of the non-rejection of the unit root null
hypothesis in the presence of cross-section variation, while mixed results are reported in León-
Ledesma (2000).
Previous findings raise the question of how much cross-section variation is necessary in
order to reject a unit root in debt-ratio data. Henceforth, we will attempt to understand whether the
IPS test rejection of the null hypothesis is due to its higher power compared with the individual
company DF tests, or whether it is due to its mixed specification of the alternative in presence of
behavioural heterogeneity. Thus, in this section we carry out IPS tests at an intermediate level of
firm pooling, i.e. in sub-samples chosen on a priori theoretical grounds. Our intention is to identify
the NS (N1-S) set defined in [7] as the theory-based sub-sample homogeneously characterised by PO
(TO) behaviour. In this way, testing for pure PO financing is performed by using the statistic
å
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Testing for pure TO financing is performed by using the statistic å
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Two points need to be made here. Firstly, homogeneity under both the null hypothesis [6’] ([6”])
and the alternative one [7’] ([7”]) is valid if we are able to correctly identify NS (N1-S) as the pure
PO (TO) behaviour sub-sample. Secondly, selection rules used to distinguish between NS and N1-S
are based on the determinants of internal financing and the target leverage suggested by PO and TO
theories; in this way, we introduce elements of multivariate analysis into the context of univariate
unit root tests.
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4.1 The IPS test results in theory-based sub-samples
We identified four types of NS and N1-S sub-samples: risk, tax exhaustion, managerial and
creditors’ agency costs. The N1-S (TO) sets correspond, respectively, to “low” risk, tax exhaustion
and creditors’ agency costs, and to “high” managerial agency costs; the NS (PO) sets are
symmetrically defined as those in which there are no determinants of the target leverage. Detailed
information about the selection rules of the theory-based sub-samples is given in the appendix,
while test results are shown in Table 2.
The first type of theory-based sub-sample involves the probability and costs of bankruptcy
(Castanias, 1983). As is the practice in empirical financial studies, failure risk is assessed by some
measure of the volatility of interest costs compared to earnings before interest charges: firms with
more volatile interest expenses may find themselves more often in the situation where earnings are
too low for debt servicing (thus implying a higher credit risk). The higher bankruptcy costs are, the
greater the effect of default risk: firms with no guarantees and proportionately fewer tangible assets,
which can be used as collateral, have higher liquidation costs. The results given in Table 2 show
that the unit root null hypothesis is rejected in the “low risk” (TO) sub-sample of companies with a
low likelihood of distress and a high liquidation value. These firms can behave according to the TO
model because banks specialise in lending to companies with low credit risk and bankruptcy costs.
Tab. 2 – t-bar tests in alternative sub-samples
Sub-sample definition
Number
of firms DF ADF(1) DF ADF(1)
Levels: Demeaned:
High risk (NS) 106 -1.512 -1.496 -1.615 -1.570
Low risk (N1-S) 367 -2.345
*** -2.136*** -2.157*** -1.924***
High tax exhaustion (NS) 126 -1.571 -1.524 -1.619 -1.603
Low tax exhaustion (N1-S) 111 -2.845
*** -2.723*** -2.300*** -2.093***
Low managerial agency costs (NS) 53 -1.565 -1.366 -1.573 -1.351
High managerial agency costs (N1-S) 25 -2.488
*** -2.185*** -2.236*** -2.082***
High creditors’ agency costs (NS) 75 -1.510 -1.421 -1.565 -1.473
Low creditors’ agency costs (N1-S) 167 -1.949
*** -1.772*** -1.940*** -1.805***
Random samples:
lower 95% bound 300 -2.159*** -2.072*** -2.046*** -1.934***
upper 95% bound 300 -1.799*** -1.665* -1.807*** -1.679**
lower 95% bound 100 -2.345*** -2.264*** -2.168*** -2.000***
upper 95% bound 100 -1.697** -1.511 -1.708** -1.594
lower 95% bound 50 -2.427*** -2.371*** -2.251*** -2.112***
upper 95% bound 50 -1.613 -1.469 -1.629 -1.501
(*), (**), and (***) 10%, 5%, and 1% significant (c.v. in Im, Pesaran and Shin, 1997, Table 4).
In bold: the theory-based statistic is outside the bootstrap 95% confidence interval.
NS (N1-S) sets are defined as theory-based sub-samples homogeneously characterised by the PO (TO) behaviour
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On the contrary, results for the “high risk” (PO) sub-sample do not reject the unit root null
hypothesis: if the probability and costs of financial distress are serious, firms do not issue debt to
finance real investment; instead, they finance themselves by using retained earnings.
The second type of theory-based sub-sample concerns the fiscal advantage of debt and tax
exhaustion (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). TO theory claims that a positive relationship exists
between the effective corporate tax rate and the incentive to use debt: firms paying high rate taxes
are likely to debt finance new investment because they can exploit a reduction in taxable income
due to the deductibility of interest expenses. Results in Table 2 confirm that companies included in
the “low tax exhaustion” sub-sample gain from the fiscal advantage of debt, and follow the TO
model of behaviour: these firms are characterised by low non-debt tax shields (such as depreciation
allowances and tax loss carry-forwards) and by high taxable income.
Clearly, companies that have been tax-exhausted in the past and have low current profits,
possess no taxable income and face a zero effective corporate tax rate on interest deductions: tax
loss carry-forwards, along with the availability of other non-debt tax shields, nullify the fiscal
advantage of debt, i.e. one of the main TO determinants of a firm’s desired leverage. Thus, the unit
root tests fail to reject the null hypothesis in the “high tax exhaustion” sub-sample: the lack of any
fiscal advantage of debt leads companies to behave according to the PO model.
The third type of theory-based sub-sample concerns the conflict of interests between
managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Jensen, 1986). According to TO theory, if
companies have free cash flow (i.e. cash flow beyond their need to finance profitable investment
opportunities), managers may wish to implement unprofitable projects that increase the various
monetary and non-monetary perquisites they obtain from their companies rather than company
profits (the over-investment problem). Managerial conflicts of interest are particularly significant in
those companies where ownership and effective control are kept separate, and dispersed
shareholders have little or no incentive to monitor managers. In this case, debt forces managers to
curb their empire-building tendencies: borrowing commits managers in advance to pay out the
firm’s free cash flow, thus avoiding wasteful investment. The results in the “high managerial
agency costs” sub-sample of Table 2 confirm the prediction made by TO theory.
The PO vision of free cash flow is totally different, however. Asymmetric information leads
managers to refuse external financing even if it means passing up a good investment opportunity
(the under-investment problem): the cost of issuing shares and/or debt at a bargain price may
outweigh the project’s net present value. In order to avoid the problem, managers build up ample
financial slack (e.g. large holdings of cash or marketable securities), and prefer to rely on internal
sources of funds for the financing of investment opportunities. This PO behaviour is particularly
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characteristic of closely-held companies where either ownership and management are synonymous,
or where a concentrated form of ownership means that shareholders can monitor management more
effectively, and are more strongly motivated to do so. The alignment of interests annuls the agency
costs normally accrued between managers and stockholders, thus rendering the TO problem of free
cash flow irrelevant. In the “low managerial agency cost” sub-sample, we fail to reject the unit root
null hypothesis: if firms have a number of profitable investment projects, their financial
requirements are satisfied through internal financing in the form of both cash flow and reductions in
liquid assets.
The fourth class of theory-based sub-sample concerns the conflict of interest and the
asymmetric information that characterise companies and their external financiers (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976, Myers, 1977, Diamond, 1991). Bank and bond debts are used by firms with
different reputations and credit quality, firms that are differently motivated towards taking action
which may be harmful to lenders. The “low creditors’ agency costs” sub-sample in Table 2 includes
TO companies: these are relatively older, more well-established firms which do not issue bonds, but
permanently issue new shares, and either do not distribute earnings or pay out dividends that are
lower than profits. Since these firms do not use public debt, it may be argued that they have long-
standing, close ties with credit institutions.9 Thanks to their long history of repaying loans, these
companies have established a reputation as good borrowers. Reputation is a positive determinant of
target leverage since it reduces the problems of asymmetric information, the conflict of interest with
creditors, and the cost of debt. The age and reputation of a company may stand in for economies of
scales when accessing new financing; issuing shares means cheaper and easier access to capital
markets; these factors speed up the adjustment of debt to its given target. Finally, dividend payment
is a way of transferring wealth from lenders to shareholders: a standard debt covenant restriction
specifies that the maximum allowable dividend payment is a positive function of both accounting
earnings and the proceeds from the sale of new equity. Not paying dividends also exposes a
company to the risk of a greater conflict of interest between managers and shareholders; in this case
bank debt plays an important  role in reducing managerial agency costs.
In the “high creditors’ agency costs” sub-sample in Table 2 we can not reject the unit root
null hypothesis. This sub-sample includes both very old and very young companies that issue public
debt claims, either do not issue shares or use new equity financing only temporarily, and pay out
dividends that are higher than profits. Thus, the PO prediction that firms show a hierarchical
                                                                
9 Moreover, these firms do not have multiple classes of debt claims outstanding which differ in dimension such as
coupon, maturity and priority. Thus, there are no intra-debtholder conflicts over wealth transfers, especially during
bankruptcy proceedings.
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preference for debt over external equity is confirmed: companies will issue equity only as a last
resort, when they are not subject to asymmetric information in the capital market. Very old firms
use less debt because they have other financial opportunities, such as access to public debt markets
(they benefit from economies of scale in flotation costs), retained earnings and internal capital
markets within the group. Very young companies display a higher degree of ex ante uncertainty
concerning the value of the firm, more creditor informational asymmetries, and use less debt.
Finally, paying out high dividends exacerbates any conflict of interest between lenders and
borrowers (thus reducing the incentive towards debt financing). Moreover, there is no need to use
debt as a means of reducing free cash flow and the discretionary power of managers: distributed
earnings bring directors’ behaviour in line with shareholders’ wealth maximisation, and firms which
pay out dividends at the same time have considerable internal funds.
4.2 The comparison of theory-based and bootstrap IPS test results
In theory-based sub-samples, the non-rejection of the null hypothesis in small PO sub-
samples could merely depend on the reduction of cross-section variability, rather than on the
identification of NS homogeneous firms. In order to investigate this issue, we performed a bootstrap
exercise whereby 1,000 samples of 300, 100 and 50 companies were randomly drawn from the
entire set of 5,079 individual-company statistics. This gave us the bootstrap distribution of the t-bar
statistics in sub-samples of similar dimensions as NS and N1-S sets. The simulated distributions were
used (in Table 2) to compare the 95% confidence intervals (obtained from the bootstrap percentiles)
with exact sample critical values (from Im, Pesaran and Shin, 1997, Table 4) as well as theory-
based sub-samples statistics (discussed in section 4.1).
The lower limit of the 95% bootstrap interval always 1% rejects the null hypothesis, and the
upper limit statistics sometimes reject the null hypothesis too.  In spite of the limited number of
firms in each sample, the heterogeneity of unit root/stationarity cases in randomly-drawn companies
pushes the IPS statistics towards the rejection area. As a result of an even more likely degree of
heterogeneity (together with averaging effects), the null rejection of the whole bootstrap interval
more frequently occurs in large samples.
The statistics from theory-based sub-samples often fall outside the 95% confidence
intervals, especially in the case of PO sub-samples. The systematic increase in the t-bar statistic
levels towards the non-rejection area in the PO sub-samples is due to the PO characteristics of the
companies we selected, and not to the small size of the cross-section.
Among the four different theory-based types, homogeneous sub-samples are probably easier
to identify using “risk” and “tax exhaustion” selection rules, since both statistics (reported in the
first four rows of Table 2) fall outside the bootstrap confidence interval. On the other hand, by using
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“managerial” and “creditors” agency cost selection rules, it seems we have to leave a share (albeit
small) of PO companies inside the TO sub-samples. There are two explanations for this.
Firstly, the original formulation of the static TO theory suggests that firms select an optimal
capital structure by adding debt until expected bankruptcy costs (“risk”) equal the tax advantage of
debt (“tax exhaustion”). In other words, a firm’s optimal debt-ratio is seen as being determined by
the trade-off between the (distress) cost and (fiscal) benefits of borrowing, with the firm’s assets
and investment plans considered a constant. It is clear that the selection rules needed in order to
distinguish between pure PO and TO behaviours are thus easier to identify. Extending our analysis
to conflicts of interest leads to the dependency of the firm’s investment policy on its capital
structure. In other words, it becomes increasingly difficult to witness pure behaviour, “all other
things being equal”, and so we need to impose various selection rules which cannot be clearly
defined on the basis of balance sheet information only. Moreover, the same “agency costs” selection
rule may lead to TO or PO behaviour depending on how it is combined with the given operative
conditions of companies: for example, an old firm may have a good long-standing relationship with
a bank, thus limiting any conflict of interests with creditors, and stimulating TO behaviour.
However, it is also true that an old - large - firm may have accumulated considerable financial slack
to be used in order to behave according to the PO model, that is, to gain greater independence from
the bank; this is especially true if a company does not want to disclose proprietary information
about corporate strategies that may benefit its competitors.
Secondly, failure and taxation characteristics are more stable over time. For example, stocks
of different types of assets (usually interpreted as proxies for distress costs), as well as corporate tax
rates, remain constant for long periods. Thus the target leverage which depends on these
characteristics may be considered stable over time as well, leading to a clear identification of TO
behaviour. On the contrary, “agency costs” sub-samples are selected on the basis of firms’
peculiarities, such as operative income and growth opportunities, which tend to change more
frequently. In this case, a univariate form of analysis makes it more difficult to decide whether an
optimal level of leverage, which changes over time in response to changes in its determinants, does
in fact exist (a possibility of TO theory), or whether a target debt-ratio does not exist and a company
issues debt only if external financing is needed (as envisaged by PO theory).
5. Conclusions
There is considerable interest in theoretical corporate financing models, as is shown by the
number of works written about this issue. On the methodological side, unit root vs stationarity
testing procedures has also received considerable attention from theorists and practitioners alike.
The present paper attempts to find new evidence regarding corporate finance. Our results are based
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on a dataset of 5,079 Italian manufacturing companies covering the period 1982-1995. Our
empirical analysis is sub-divided into three parts, the results of which can be summarised as
follows.
The single-company test outcomes are largely in line with the PO prediction: in about 80%
of the cases, the null hypothesis of debt-ratio integration is not 10% rejected. Only a small number
of the firms in the sample revert to a constant target debt-ratio. However, apparent non-stationarity
can sometimes be induced either by low power, or by possible changes in the target debt-ratio
levels.
The cross-section variability introduced at panel level increases power, and in our case
enables us to clearly reject the unit root null hypothesis. However, the companies in the panel can
not be labelled as “pure” TO followers, since the alternative hypothesis of the IPS test allows for
both TO and PO cases.
Since the potentially false presumption of behavioural homogeneity under the null
hypothesis may induce us to reject the unit root hypothesis, we made inferences from sub-samples,
chosen on theoretical grounds in order to increase homogeneity. The test results, in keeping with
theoretical predictions, suggest that theoretical insights can help identify those companies that
behave in the same way with regard to their financial decisions. A bootstrap exercise, where sub-
samples are randomly drawn from the whole dataset, reinforces the idea that theoretically-based
sub-sample results are due to the homogeneity of financial behaviour, rather than to reduced sample
size.
Overall, previous results would seem to point to two general conclusions. Firstly, since pure
PO behaviour can be only found in specific sub-samples, a certain percentage of Italian firms
adjusts towards a target debt-ratio. This finding is in keeping with the results reported in Bontempi
(2001): the best way of defining the financial behaviour of Italian manufacturing firms is to
formulate models where both PO and TO components are admissible.
Secondly, by using the panel unit root test we can only reject the pure pecking order model
of behaviour, but not the pure trade-off model. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) claim that
“empirical work on capital structure must devise tests of hypotheses that can be rejected” (p. 243),
and find that “the statistical power of some usual tests of the TO model is virtually nil” (p. 219). In
a similar manner, the different testing procedure we propose has the power to reject the pure
pecking order model under the null hypothesis, but not the pure trade-off one.
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Appendix: The definition of the theory-based sub-samples
Table A.1 illustrates the selection rules adopted when defining the four types of theory-
based sub-samples. The variables used are both discrete and continuous. Discrete variables indicate
whether a particular condition does in fact exist during the sample period. Continuous variables are
transformed into historical means and then categorised using seven quantiles, Q1, Q2, ..., Q7, which
respectively indicate the 12.5th, 25th,..., 87.5th percentiles; Q4 corresponds to the 50th percentile or
median. The choice of a greater number of quantiles than are usually chosen (three is the standard
number) allows for the more flexible classification of companies: it enables to identify extreme PO
and TO characteristics, while at the same time preserving the general information contained in the
quartiles. Finally, all the results obtained in the four types of theory-based sub-samples are
confirmed using various check rules, as illustrated in the second part of Table A.1, which are added
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to and/or replace the selection rules adopted10. From the theoretical point of view, such check rules
allow for a further verification of our capacity to select homogeneous PO- and TO-type companies
on the basis of the given firms’ attributes as indicated by financial theory. From the empirical point
of view, as check rules modify the absolute and relative size of theory-based sub-samples, they also
offer further evidence that our results do not merely depend on the reduction in the variability of the
cross-section.
The “risk” type theory-based sub-samples are selected by combining indicators of interest
volatility, guarantees and capital intensity. Investment in intangible assets is added as a check rule.
1. Interest volatility is measured by comparing the firm’s standard deviation in total interest
charges with the firm’s standard deviation in earnings before interest expenses are deducted. In
the “high (low) risk” sub-sample this ratio is greater (equal to or smaller) than one, indicating a
higher (lower) likelihood of financial distress.
2. Guarantees are measured by a dummy variable indicating whether companies have mortgages,
pawns, pledges and warrants granted by other firms, affiliates or banks during the sample
period. “High (low) risk” firms never have guarantees during the sample period (have
guarantees for at least one year during the sample period).
3. Capital intensity is measured by the ratio of real sales11 to the number of employees. “High
(low) risk” companies are labour (capital) intensive, i.e. their ratios are lower (higher) than the
87.5th percentile. The lower capital intensity is, the smaller tangible assets and liquidation
values are.
4. Findings regarding “risk” sub-samples are confirmed by adding a check rule which measures
how long companies invest in intangible assets: a firm’s liquidation value is lower if it derives
more from future and specialised projects than from tangible assets-in-place. The check rule is a
dummy variable indicating whether or not companies invest in intangible assets for more than
one year during the sample period. In the case of repeated investment in intangible assets, the
“high risk” sub-sample includes 102 companies behaving according to the PO model because
such projects are risky, more subject to asymmetric information and difficult to finance
externally. On the contrary, the “low risk” sub-sample of companies not investing, or investing
for one year only, in intangible assets (8 firms), is characterised by the relatively lower cost of
failure and a more evident TO form of behaviour.
                                                                
10 The results of the t-bar tests in these sub-samples are not given, but they are available upon request from the authors.
11 Deflated by the production price indexes of the 13 sub-sectors of manufacturing industry reported by the Italian
Central Statistical Office, ISTAT.
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The “tax exhaustion” type theory-based sub-samples are selected according to past tax
exhaustion status and past non-debt and interest tax-shields with respect to current profits. The
check rule selects certain firms according to the duration of their tax exhaustion status.
1. Tax exhaustion is measured using a categorical variable: this equals 0 in the case of firms with
lagged pre-tax earnings that are constantly positive during the sample period; 1 if lagged pre-tax
earnings were negative or zero for a period from 1 to 5 years; 2 if lagged pre-tax earnings were
negative or zero for more than 5 years12. In the “high (low) tax exhaustion” sub-sample this
categorical variable is equal to 1 (0), and companies have large (small) tax loss carry-forwards
that can be used in order to reduce current taxable income.
2. Non-debt tax shields are measured by the ratio of lagged level of tangible and intangible
depreciation allowances and total assets. In the “high (low) tax exhaustion” sub-sample non-
debt tax shields are above the 62.5th (below the 50th) percentile.
3. The fiscal advantage of debt is measured by the effective lagged interest rates paid, net of the
statutory corporate tax rate if companies were not tax exhausted. The effective interest rates are
given by the ratio of interest charges on bank and quasi-bank debt (leasing, factoring, etc.) and
the corresponding debt. In the “high (low) tax exhaustion” sub-sample, effective interest rates
are below the 50th (above the 62.5th) percentile.
4. Net earnings in real terms 13 account for the relevance of non-debt and interest tax shields in
exhausting current taxable income and reducing the effective tax rate on the basis of which the
fiscal advantage of debt is computed. Companies included in the “high (low) tax exhaustion”
sub-sample have low (high) current profits, i.e. below the 50th (above the 62.5th) percentile.
5. According to TO theory, the lower taxable income and effective corporate tax rate are, the lower
desired leverage is. Thus, the check rule selects 62 “low tax exhaustion” firms that have been
tax-exhausted for a period of 1 to 5 years, and 58 “high tax exhaustion” companies that have
been in loss for more than 5 years. The unit root null hypothesis is still rejected in the first case:
even though these companies, having been tax-exhausted in the past, can exploit the tax loss
carry-forwards in order to reduce taxable income, they still gain from the fiscal advantage of
debt. Conversely, the unit root null hypothesis is not rejected in the second case: due to the
relevance of tax loss carry-forwards, these companies have low current profits and thus cannot
deduce interest expenses.
                                                                
12 This classification is due to the possibility loss-making Italian companies have of carrying forward past losses for a
period of up to five years.
13 Deflated by the production price indexes of the 13 sub-sectors of manufacturing industry reported by ISTAT.
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The “managerial agency costs” type theory-based sub-samples are selected by combining
indicators of previous cash flow, current investment opportunities and profitability, size and
corporate ownership. The check rule uses group-membership condition in place of the ownership
structure selection rule.
1. Cash flow is calculated from lagged operative earnings before depreciation, non-operative and
extraordinary items, and other non-cash expenses14; it is net of total interest expenses and
dividends paid, and is expressed in terms of net assets. In the “low (high) managerial agency
costs” sub-sample, cash flow is below (equal to or above) the 75th percentile.
2. Investment opportunities are given by the sum of net investment in plant, equipment and R&D,
and the variation in net working capital, as a percentage of total net assets. Net working capital
is defined as current assets (chiefly accounts receivable, inventories and cash) less current
liabilities (accounts payable, accruals, deferred taxes, investment tax credits, and minority
interests). Investment opportunities represent the total financing requirements of the firm, which
can be satisfied by building up debt or equity accounts through stock issuance, or by using
internal financing in the form of cash flow. The variation in net working capital indicates the
extent to which firms drawn upon liquid assets in order to finance investment needs, or the
degree to which they choose to invest in liquid assets in order to build up financial slack to be
used at a later date; thus, the effect of free cash flow on new debt only emerges when we check
for changes in working capital. In the “low (high) managerial agency costs” sub-sample,
investment opportunities are equal to or above (below) the 62.5th percentile.
3. Investment profitability is proxied by the ratio of sales to gross investment, both tangible and
intangible. In the “low (high) managerial agency costs” sub-sample, investment profitability is
equal to or above (below) the 75th percentile.
4. Size is measured in terms of the number of employees during the sample period. The “low
(high) managerial agency costs” sub-sample includes medium-large (small-medium) companies
which have more than 50 (from 0 to 249) employees.
5. Corporate ownership is measured by a dummy variable equal to 1 if the first shareholder holds
more than 50% of total shares issued. Since managerial agency costs result from the separation
of ownership (residual risk bearing function) and control (decision function), one way of
controlling them is by restricting the ownership on residual claims 15 to one major agent who
                                                                
14 Since the Continental European accounting system allows companies to smooth out profits using hidden reserves, this
adjusted measure of book earnings avoids the undesired effects of window dressing by some firms.
15  Claims to the net cash flows that result from differences between inflows and promised payments to other claim-
holders.
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bears the wealth effects of his decisions. Thus, in the “low (high) managerial agency costs” sub-
sample, ownership is concentrated (widespread).
6. Concentrated ownership is more common than the more dispersed form in large Italian
companies, since they generally belong to pyramidal business groups, and this enables the
ultimate owner to control the firm’s assets using the least amount of capital. As a check rule, we
substitute the group-membership condition for the ownership selection rule. This does not
change the PO test result obtained for “low managerial agency costs” (119 firms). The over-
investment problem due to a managerial conflict of interests is thus limited without creating a
sub-investment problem due to imperfections in the credit market; this is because a group offers
a company both credit from affiliates (controlled, linked and controlling firms) as well as other
financial funds from the internal capital markets. The TO test result confirms the role of debt in
reducing managerial agency costs for those 303 companies characterised by “high managerial
agency costs”, an unconditioned ownership structure and non-membership of a pyramidal
group.
Tab. A.1 – Definition of theory-based sub-samples
Selection rules risk tax exhaustion managerial agency costs creditors’ agency costs
high low high low low high high low
Interest volatility >1 1
Guarantees no yes
Capital intensity <Q7 >Q7
Tax exhaustion 1-5 years never
Non-debt tax shields >Q5 <Q4
Fiscal adv. of debt <Q4 >Q5
Net earnings <Q4 >Q5
Cash flow <Q6 Q6
Inv. opportunities Q5 <Q5
Inv. profitability Q6 <Q6
Size medium-
large
small-
medium
Ownership concentrated diffused
Age old or young middle
Issue of new shares no or 1-4years >4 years
Issue of new bonds yes no
Dividend payments  profits no or <profits
Check rules
Intangible inv. >1 year 1 year
Tax exhaustion >5 years 1-5 years
Group yes no
Mergers yes no
The “creditors’ agency costs” type theory-based sub-samples are selected by taking into
consideration indicators of age, the issuing of bonds and shares on the capital markets, and the
paying of dividends. The check rule replaces the payout selection rule in extraordinary operations
such as mergers.
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1. The “high (low) creditors’ agency costs” sub-sample includes old-young (average-age)
companies, founded either before the 1950s or after the 1970s (between the 50s-70s). Old - and
very large - firms use less bank debt because they can borrow both in public capital markets and
in internal capital markets (inside the pyramidal group); young firms probably use less debt
because they have not had time to build up a reputation, and are characterised by a higher
degree of ex-ante uncertainty about the value of the firm and more creditor informational
asymmetries. Average-aged firms generally have established reputations as good borrowers.
2. Since our firms are not listed and do not go public, the extent to which they may be financed by
external equity (bonds) is measured by the change in common and preferred stocks (bonds).
With regard to the issue of new bonds and shares, the dummy variables classify PO and TO-
types as follows: the “high creditors’ agency costs” sub-sample does not use new equity
financing, or uses it for a short period (from 1 to 4 years), whereas it uses public debt financing
in the form of bonds; the “low creditors’ agency costs” sub-sample makes extensive use of new
equity financing (for more than 4 years), but does not borrow on the capital market in the form
of bonds.
3. Companies in the “high creditors’ agency costs” sub-sample pay out dividends that are higher
than profits. Companies in the “low creditors’ agency costs” sub-sample either do not distribute
earnings or pay out dividends that are lower than profits.
4. PO unit root test results do not change if we replace the dividend selection rule with a check rule
regarding extraordinary operations such as take-overs (120 companies): if inefficient managerial
behaviour increases the risk that the firm will be acquired by another company, directors are
more likely to seek market value maximisation. Moreover, this fact may be seen as a check of
possible sample bias deriving from the fact that mergers may produce significant changes in a
firm’s financial structure and accounting statements. Without such screens, the balance sheet
data may give us a distorted view of a firm’s normal financing behaviour over time. Despite the
existence of other possible reasons behind mergers, results seem to support the PO hypothesis
that a merger is also a way of acquiring more financial slack, especially if the buyer is cash-
flow-rich and the taken-over company offers good investment opportunities. TO unit root
results do not change if we replace the dividend-payment selection rule with a check rule
regarding the non-performance of extraordinary operations (447 companies). This may be
ascribed to the fact that such complex operations may make it easier for firms to deceive the
bank about the true state of the company, its actual guarantees and future projects, thus creating
a greater conflict of interests with lenders.
